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Abstract 
 
In Bowers (2016) I argued that there are practical problems with educational neuroscience 
(EN) that explain why there are no examples of EN improving teaching, and principled 
problems with the logic motivating EN that explain why there likely never will be.  In the 
following I consider the main responses raised by both Gabrieli (this issue) as well as 
Howard-Jones et al. (this issue) and find them all unconvincing.  Following this exchange 
there are still no examples of EN providing new insights to teaching in the classroom, there 
are still no examples of EN providing new insights to remedial instructions for individuals, 
and as I detail here, there is no evidence that EN is useful for the diagnosis of learning 
difficulties.  The authors have also failed to address the reasons why EN is unlikely to 
benefit educational outcomes in the future.  Psychology, by contrast, can (and has) made 
important discoveries that can (and should) be used to improve teaching and diagnostic 
tests for learning difficulties.  This is not a debate about whether science is relevant to 
education, but what sort of science is relevant.  
 
Keywords:  educational neuroscience; education; instruction; neuroscience; mind, 
brain, and education. 
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Psychology not Educational Neuroscience is the way forward for improving educational 
outcomes for all children: Response to Gabrieli (2016) and Howard-Jones et al. (2016) 
In Bowers (2016) I argued that there are practical problems with educational 
neuroscience (EN) that explain why there are no examples of EN improving teaching, and 
principled problems with the logic motivating EN that explain why there likely never will be.  
Gabrieli (this issue) and Howard-Jones et al. (this issue) raise a number of objections to my 
characterization of EN, including the fact that the goals of EN are more general than improving 
teaching.  I will respond to these points, but the key take-home points I would emphasize from 
the start are that the authors did not provide any good examples of EN improving classroom or 
remedial instruction, and they did not provide any reasons to believe that EN research will span 
the “bridge too far” (Bruer, 1997) in the future. 
Before responding to the two commentaries in turn, I want to emphasize that my 
critique of EN should not be taken as an argument against neuroscience, nor as a claim that 
education should be uninformed by science. Rather, my main claim is that neuroscience (or 
cognitive neuroscience) is unlikely to be useful in designing or evaluating teaching methods for 
the classroom, or for interventions for individuals with learning difficulties.  Furthermore, as I 
emphasize here, there is little reason to think that neuroscience will improve educational 
outcomes through the early diagnosis of learning disorders.  The core problem is that for these 
purposes neuroscience does not add anything above and beyond psychology.  Psychology, by 
contrast, can (and has) made important discoveries that can (and should) be used to improve 
teaching and diagnostic tests for learning difficulties.  This is not a debate about whether 
science is relevant to education, but what sort of science is relevant.  
Gabrieli (2016): 
Gabrieli agrees with me that EN has yet to make any practical benefits for teaching in 
the classroom, but he does not see this as a serious problem given that he views EN as basic 
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research enterprise that addresses topics of importance to education.  He sees EN as analogous 
to cognitive neuroscience, or affective neuroscience, or social neuroscience that characterize 
the functional brain organization of perception, learning and memory, thought, emotion, and 
social cognition. And just as advances in cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience are 
expected to contribute to treatments for a range of disorders, including schizophrenia, 
depression, anxiety, and autism, advances in EN are expected to improve teaching in the future.  
I see two problems with this characterization of EN.  First, in contrast with Gabrieli, 
many researchers claim that EN has already helped improve teaching in the classroom, and the 
explosion of articles, journals, research centers, teaching programs, and funding directed at EN 
reflect the widespread view that EN is poised to further advance teaching in the near-term.  I 
gave a number of quotes to this effect in the target article, and indeed, Howard-Jones et al. 
summarize multiple examples of EN taken to be relevant to informing instruction today (see 
below).  Indeed, the push to train teachers about neuroscience  (see target article) only makes 
sense on the view that EN can improve teaching in the classroom now.  
 Second, and more importantly, Gabrieli’s optimism regarding the promise of improving 
teaching through EN is based on a flawed an analogy to cognitive, social, and affective 
neurosciences.  It does indeed seem plausible that these areas of neuroscience may in the future 
improve the wellbeing of persons with learning difficulties, depression, anxiety disorders, 
schizophrenia, etc., and indeed, neuropharmacology has already lead to important clinical 
treatments for learning difficulties, depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, etc.  The 
critical point to note, however, is that in all cases, the clinical advances were the direct result of 
brain intervention (e.g., Ritalin for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, antidepressants, 
antianxiety, antischizophrenic drugs).  This is qualitatively different to the claim that an 
improved understanding of the brain will inform behavioral interventions (Bishop, 2013, makes 
the same point).  Different levels of analyses support different levels of intervention: A better 
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understanding of genetics will likely support new genetic interventions (some relevant to 
education), a better understanding of the brain will likely support new medical interventions 
(some relevant to education), and a better understanding of psychology will likely support new 
behavioral interventions (some relevant to education).  And of course, linking levels of 
description is a fundamental goal of science (e.g., understanding the neurobiological and 
genetic basis of dyslexia is important).  But whether neuroscience (or cognitive neuroscience) 
can contribute above and beyond psychology to designing and evaluating behavioral 
intervention is anything but clear.  The analogy to medical interventions is common (also see 
initial quote by Howard-Jones et al.) but misguided. 
Gabrieli and I also disagree about the current success and future promise of EN for 
individualized instruction and prediction.  According to Gabrieli, a key achievement of EN is 
that it improves our ability to predict whether a child should be given a specific type of 
instruction or is likely to have difficulties in the future.  Gabrieli describes a number of studies 
that are taken as strong evidence for the success of neuroscience in making predictions: for 
example, diagnosing reading disorders or predicting whether a specific math tutoring 
intervention is well suited for specific children. 
Indeed, there is now a large literature and long history of using brain imaging to 
diagnose future learning difficulties and longitudinal outcomes across a range of domain, 
including reading (e.g., Hoeft et al., 2007), language more generally (Guttorm et al., 2005), 
second language learning (Qi et al., 2014), mathematics (Dumontheil & Klingberg, 2012), 
future working memory capacity (Ullman et al., 2014), amongst others domains.  In an 
excellent review article, Gabrieli et al. (2015) reviewed 72 neuroimaging studies used to make 
predictions for a wide range of behavioral outcomes. A key finding from this review is that 61 
of the 72 identified studies were correlational in that brain measures were associated with 
known behavioral outcomes.  As noted by Gabrieli et al. (2015), the success of these studies to 
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predict the outcomes is better described as “post-diction” – akin to correctly predicting stock 
market crashes in the past rather than in the future.  This greatly inflates the estimates of 
prediction, especially when post-diction is based on studies with small sample sizes, that 
include a wide range possible variables (brain measures) for prediction, and where the authors 
have a great deal of analytical flexibility (as typical in these studies).   
One way to provide a better estimate of prediction is “cross validation” in which a 
subset of data from a given study are used to develop a model that can be used for prediction, 
and then this model is used with the remaining data in order to make predictions.  Gabrieli et al. 
(2015) identify four such studies relevant to education that employed some form of cross 
validation, three concerned with reading, one with math, and only one of these studies was 
carried out on young children that could in principle be used in to inform early diagnosis (Bach 
et al., 2013).  However, the authors themselves urged caution in interpreting these results given 
the extremely small sample size in the study (11 normal and 6 poor readers).  Indeed, 
underpowered studies that report significant effects are the least likely to replicate (e.g., Button 
et al., 2013). 
As noted by Gabrieli et al. (2015), cross-validation is no substitute for making 
predictions on an independent sample.  Indeed, these predictions are only useful to the extent 
that someone else can successfully predict learning outcomes in another lab with a comparable 
sample of participants. But despite over two decades of using neuroscience to make 
predictions, not a single study relevant to education has been carried out (and only 1 out of 72 
studies in the Gabrieli et al. review).  Before making any strong claims regarding the predictive 
successes of EN it is important that replications on independent samples are carried out. 
Even if EN is shown to support predictions in independent samples of children, two 
more hurdles must be passed before the results are useful for education.  First, the predictions 
from imaging are only relevant to educators if they contribute something above and beyond the 
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predictions based on behavioral measures.  However, in most (or all) cases in which imaging 
studies are claimed to improve prediction above behavioral measures alone, some relevant 
behavioral measures were not included.  Consider reading, the domain in which the most 
prediction studies have been carried out.  In a recent behavioral study, Heath et al. (2014) 
assessed the pre-literacy skills of 102 four-year olds at the beginning of Preschool and then 
assessed rapid automatized naming at the beginning and end of kindergarten.  Children’s 
literacy outcomes were measured at the end of Year 1 (age 6-7).  Combining these behavioral 
measures with a range of family factors, including parents’ phonological awareness, provided 
accurate classification of reading difficulties (sensitivity = .85; specificity = .90; overall correct 
= .88).  Nevertheless, few neuroimaging studies concerned with the prediction of reading have 
considered whether imaging outperforms behavioral studies when family factors are 
considered, and no study has considered parents’ phonological awareness, a powerful predictor 
in this study.  This again suggests that the unique contribution of neuroscience to prediction has 
been overestimated.   
  Second, even if we assume that the predictions (or post-dictions) from neuroimaging 
studies are not over-estimated, and further, we assume that neuroimaging tools will continue to 
provide significant predictions above and beyond the best behavioral measures, there are good 
reasons to question the value of making earlier diagnoses.  Again consider the domain of 
reading where is it frequently claimed that early diagnosis is key.  A question that needs to be 
asked is how early?  Behavioral measures appear to do a good job in making predictions in 
kindergarten (Heath et al., 2014).  Would it be helpful to diagnosis likely dyslexia earlier, 
before children are introduced to written letters and words?  This seems to be the assumption of 
various EN studies that have attempted to diagnosis dyslexia as early as 36 hours after birth 
(e.g., Molfese, 2000).  But given that the best forms of interventions involve training skills 
directly relevant to literacy (e.g., P. Bowers, Kirby, & Deacon, 2010; Snowling & Hulme, 
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2012), it is not clear what benefits can be gained from interventions carried out in younger 
children.  Indeed, there is little evidence that interventions focusing on non-written materials 
are successful.  For example, the intervention FastForword is based on the claim that dyslexia 
is the result of rapid auditory temporal processing skills that can be trained before children are 
introduced to written letters and words.  However, the main evidence for the efficacy of 
FastForword comes from flawed neuroimaging studies (Bishop, 2013).  When a systematic 
review of behavioral studies was carried out there is no evidence that FastForword improves 
reading (Strong, Torgerson, Torgerson, & Hulme, 2011).   
In sum, Gabrieli provides no good reasons to support the claim that EN will be useful for 
classroom interventions in the future, no evidence that EN has improved the predictions of 
learning disorders above and beyond behavioral data given that there are no examples of 
neuroscience predicting learning disorders in independent samples of children, and no reasons 
to think that earlier predictions would improve educational outcomes in any case. 
Howard-Jones et al.: 
 Howard-Jones et al. are more critical of my critique of EN, and more positive about the 
current successes of EN in informing teaching in the classroom.  Indeed, they identify a number 
of EN studies that they claim have already provided important insights for teaching.  However, 
their commentary reveals a number of theoretical confusions regarding my position, and their 
examples of EN contributing useful insights for instruction do not bear up to scrutiny. 
Theoretical confusions 
According to Howard-Jones et al., I am attacking a straw man when I challenge the view 
that neuroscience alone is useful for education. They point out that the “neuroscience” in EN 
refers to cognitive neuroscience that is concerned with making links between the brain and 
behavior.  As a consequence, psychology is central to EN.  My focus on the neuroscience to the 
exclusion of other fields is thought to undermine my critique of EN.   
EDUCATIONAL NEUROSCIENCE 9 
But this reveals a fundamental confusion regarding my position.  My claim is that the 
neuroscience in cognitive neuroscience does not contribute anything to education above and 
beyond psychology.  As I wrote: 
Even areas of neuroscience that focus on both brain and behavior, such 
as cognitive neuroscience, are only relevant to education to the 
extent that they provide new insights into behavior. (no page number yet) 
This conclusion was supported by my detailed review of the literature where I failed to identify 
any examples of the neuroscience in EN contributing any novel insights into the design or 
evaluation of teaching in the classroom, or any insights for interventions for individuals with 
learning disorders.  Below I consider the examples of EN that Howard-Jones highlight and show 
why these studies also fail to address my critique.  
Another (related) confusion by Howard-Jones et al. is expressed in their passage:  
In Bowers (2016), psychology and neuroscience are pitted as competitors in 
explaining behavior and, using arguments rehearsed by others (Bishop, 2014; 
Coltheart & McArthur, 2012; Davis, 2004; Schumacher, 2007), it is proposed that 
psychology should have central status. (no page number yet) 
In fact, I agree with Howard-Jones et al. that behavior and brain play essential roles in 
cognitive neuroscience given that the goal of cognitive neuroscience is to explain the brain 
basis of behavior.  There is no “knowledge hierarchy” in this domain.  But again, my claim is 
neuroscience is irrelevant to the design and evaluation of teaching. This is why I suggested 
replacing the “bridge too far” analogy with the “one-way street” analogy: The neuroscience in 
EN is of interest to neuroscientists and psychologists, and it may contribute to future medical 
advances relevant to education, but it is (and likely always will be) irrelevant to the task of 
designing or evaluating instruction. 
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A third theoretical confusion used to argue for the promise of EN is expressed in the 
following passage: 
…if one accepts that psychological theory can contribute to educational practice 
and that neuroscience can contribute to psychological theory, it is illogical to 
disallow the transitive inference and to instead argue that, in principle, neuroscience 
is irrelevant to educational practice. 
But there is nothing transitive about this argument: Neuroscience might improve psychological 
theories in ways that are irrelevant to education.  Indeed, given the different levels of analysis 
involved in brain and behavioral research (as noted in my response to Gabrieli), there is no 
reason to assume that the neuroscience in EN will add any new insights relevant to teaching. 
What would be relevant are examples of neuroscience providing unique insights relevant to 
designing or evaluating instruction in the classroom or for individuals, or to early diagnosis of 
learning disorders, or at minimum, good reasons to think there is promise of achieving these 
goals in the future. Thus it is interesting that Howard-Jones et al. have provided specific 
examples of EN research contributing insights relevant to education.  However, I would 
characterize these studies in the same way as the studies I reviewed in the target article; 
namely, they are either trivial in the sense that the finding are self-evident, misleading in the 
sense that behavioral studies already motivated the interventions, or unwarranted in the sense 
that the recommendations do no follow from the EN study.  
A review of the evidence cited by Howard-Jones et al. 
Under the heading “Examples illustrating the EN approach and its potential” Howard-
Jones first cite Tanaka et al. (2011), as did Gabrieli in his commentary.  This study provides 
neuroscientific evidence against the IQ-discrepancy criteria for diagnosing dyslexia given that 
discrepant and non-discrepant poor readers show similar brain abnormalities.  As noted by 
Gabreili, this finding has important policy implications, as it suggests that poor readers ought to 
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receive remedial support regardless of IQ.  I agree with this, but it is important to note that 
behavioral arguments against the IQ-discrepancy definition of dyslexia have a long history 
(e.g., Stanovitch, 1991), and Tanaka et al. motivate their neuroimaging study by a long list of 
behavioral studies that reported similar phonological deficits in both discrepant and non-
discrepant poor readers, and critically, cite multiple behavioral studies have shown that both 
types of readers respond similarly to remedial reading programs designed to ameliorate 
phonological deficits.  This later finding is far more relevant to policy than the (interesting) 
finding that discrepant and non-discrepant poor readers show similar brain anomalies.  Indeed, 
like many of the studies I review below, this is a good example of the “one-way street” in 
which EN is relevant to neuroscientists and psychologists but provides no new suggestions for 
improving interventions that would be relevant to teachers. 
Next, Howard-Jones et al. cite a successful intervention study for dyslexia by Gonzalez et 
al. (2015) that was motivated by neuroscience research reported by Froyen et al. (2008).  
Froyen et al. reported electrophysiological research showing abnormal processing of letter-
sound correspondences in dyslexics, and critically, Howard-Jones et al claim that this study 
showed that the deficit persists longer than was previously suggested by behavioral data.  
However, Foyen et al. (2008) cited behavioral evidence suggesting just this, and the 
intervention used by Gonzalez et al (2015) study was a close adaptation of a previous study 
motivated by behavioral data (Tijms, 2007).   
Next, Howard-Jones et al. cite an intervention by Tsang, Blair, Bofferding, and Schwarz 
(2015) designed to teach children negative number concepts that was motivated by various 
neuroscience results.  But as Howard-Jones et al. note themselves, the initial hypothesis was 
motivated by behavioral studies.  The same is true for the Number Race and Graphogame 
interventions that are designed to train approximate comparison processes on the one hand, and 
learning exact numerosities and symbol knowledge on the other.  Once again, behavioral 
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evidence relevant to designing these instructions preceded the neuroscience (e.g., see Wilson, 
Revkin, Cohen, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2006).  For early behavioural evidence in support of the 
claim that instruction should involve comparing numerical magnitudes see Griffin, Case, and 
Siegler (1994). 
It is not a coincidence that all these EN studies were carried out after the relevant 
hypothesis was advanced on the basis of behavioral data.  Indeed, the goal of cognitive 
neuroscience is to understand how the brain supports psychological processes, and accordingly, 
psychology comes first.  As Howard-Jones et al. write themselves: “…when Bowers claims 
that instruction investigated by EN is often first motivated by behavioral data, we sincerely 
hope this is true and continues to be so”.  This does raise the issue of how EN is going to help 
motivate new forms of instruction above and beyond psychology.   
One possible response to the observation that psychology comes first is that the 
neuroscience provides stronger evidence for a given hypothesis.  On this view, EN provides a 
stronger motivation to design an intervention.  This seems to be the implication of the 
following point: 
Bowers is completely uncritical of behavioral evidence. For example, he does not 
consider that many measures of behavior are often unreliable and lack validity (e.g. 
Holloway & Ansari, 2009; Maloney, Risko, Preston, Ansari, & Fugelsang, 2010; 
Stolz, Besner, & Carr, 2005) or that the absence of a behavioral change on a 
psychological measure of behavior does not imply that no change in behavior has 
occurred. By arguing that neuroimaging has nothing to add if behavior does not 
change, Bowers makes a classic misinterpretation of null findings. 
I agree that there is a replication crisis in psychology, but the problem is worse in 
cognitive neuroscience.  The root causes of the replication crisis are the same in both domains: 
studies with small sample sizes, single experiments without replication, analytical flexibility 
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(that can lead to p-hacking), and a bias to publish significant results.  In contrast to 
psychological studies, neuroscience studies tend to have smaller sample sizes, fewer 
replications, and much more analytical flexibility.  The consequence is a replication crisis in 
neuroscience as well (Button et al., 2013).  Indeed, this helps explain why many EN results 
claimed to support specific forms of instruction are not supported when assessed with more 
powerful behavioral experiments.  For example, Bishop (2013) reviewed all the studies 
between 2003-2011 that measured brain function before and after an intervention that focused 
on improving language skills.  All six studies were seriously flawed (e.g., underpowered, 
analytical flexibility, no replication) and the conclusions were not supported in multiple and 
more powerful behavioral studies.   
And more importantly, even if the neuroscience results are robust and reliable, the link 
between the neuroscience and the cognitive processes that support a given skill is often indirect 
and hard to specify.  For example, abnormal BOLD signals in visual cortex may reflect 
abnormal processes in another brain area (Dorjee & Bowers, 2012), and indeed, as noted in the 
target article, Olulade Napoliello, and Eden (2013) attributed changes in the BOLD signal in 
V5/MT (visual cortex) to improvements in phonological processing.  If the goal is to identify 
the cognitive processes that are responsible for learning deficits, then it is almost always more 
straightforward to test behavior.  For instance, in order to test the hypothesis that phonological 
processes are impaired in dyslexia, rather than looking at BOLD signals in V5/MT (involved in 
visual motion processing), or temporoparietal cortex (involved in phonological processes), or 
ventral occipito-temporal cortex (the visual word form area), researchers should measure the 
phonological skills of children who are struggling to read. 
Howard-Jones et al.’s additional claim that I have made a “classic misinterpretation” of 
null findings reflects another fundamental misunderstanding of my position.  If a given 
behavioral study fails to improve performance on some task then I agree it does not rule out the 
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possibility that the intervention was effective.  The study may have been underpowered, or the 
wrong behavioral test may have been administered.  However, these type-1 errors cannot be 
rectified with neuroimaging.  Putting aside the dangers of false positives in neuroimaging 
results (given the reasons noted above), an intervention is only useful to the extent that it 
produces functionally relevant behavioral outcomes.  If a researcher is concerned that a 
behavioral intervention was successful but nevertheless null results were obtained, the only 
appropriate response is to carry out a better and more powerful behavioral study.  As I wrote in 
the target article, brain measures should not even be used as a more sensitive measure of 
behavioral change: 
Rather than using (expensive) fMRI to look for a weak training effect that may 
or may not manifest itself in behavior following further training, 
researchers should explore whether more extensive (cheaper) behavioral 
training does indeed result in useful changes in behavior. (no page number) 
Continuing on with examples of the successes of EN, Howard-Jones et al. describe how 
EN can provide evidence for the compensatory processes in remediation, with implications for 
designing instruction.  The authors cite a study that found regions in the right prefrontal cortex 
to be more activated after a phonological remediation for dyslexia (Shaywitz et al., 2004).  
Based on this observation, Howard-Jones et al. argue that a better understanding of these brain 
regions will contribute to future interventions. 
But the strategy of studying the prefrontal cortex in an effort to design better forms of 
interventions is misguided given that these regions are undoubtedly involved in supporting 
many different functions (any one of which may have contributed to these results), 
characterizing these functions is no easy matter, and it is not clear that characterizing these 
functions will provide any new insights into instruction.  To make things worse, as summarized 
in the target article, the pattern of BOLD changes in this study were more complicated than 
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summarized by Howard-Jones et al., making it all the more unclear what teaching implications 
follow from this study.   
Psychological research, by contrast, leads to highly specific hypotheses regarding 
possible compensatory strategies that may be useful for dyslexics.  For example, we know that 
learning is best when information is studied in a meaningful and organized way (Bower, Clark, 
Lesgold, and Winzenz, 1969), and we also know that the writing system is English is highly 
organized and logical when morphological and etymological constraints are considered in 
addition to phonology (Venezky, 1967). This suggests that we might design literacy 
interventions that highlight the meaning and organization of English spellings rather than focus 
so heavily on meaningless letter-sound correspondences (phonics); what P. Bowers and Kirby 
(2010) called “structured word inquiry”.  Consistent with this hypothesis, there is now growing 
evidence that teaching children the logic of their writing system helps reading and writing (e.g., 
Devonshire, Morris, Fluck, 2013), and vocabulary (e.g., P. Bowers & Kirby, 2010), especially 
in younger and struggling children.  It is hard to imagine how cognitive neuroscience could 
have led to this hypothesis.  Of course, more experimental work is needed before any strong 
conclusions are warranted regarding structured word inquiry, and this will require randomized 
control trials that measure reading skills. 
Advocates of EN often do not appreciate the challenge that compensatory processes 
pose for EN.  For example, consider the observation that dyscalculia is often associated with 
abnormal activation of the intrparietal cortex.  This finding is taken as evidence that dyscalculia 
is associated with in impaired “number sense”.  This in turn is thought to have implications for 
education.  For example, Butterworth et al. (2011) conclude “[a]lthough the neuroscience may 
suggest what should be taught, it does not specify how it should be taught” (p. 1051).  Howard-
Jones et al. again highlight the importance of this work because it identifies what should be 
taught (the authors suggest that other forms of research can build on EN studies to identify how 
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to best achieve this).  However, this conclusion rests on the standard logic of EN; namely, the 
claim that interventions should target the deficit.  An equally plausible hypothesis is that 
interventions should target compensatory skills.  That is, the neuroscience does not indicate 
what should be taught.  Behavioral studies are needed to distinguish between these two 
possibilities.  And in any case, the hypothesis that dyscalculia is associated with a deficit in the 
“number sense” was first supported on the basis of behavioral studies (e.g., Koontz & Berch, 
1996; Landerl, Bevan, Butterworth, 2004).  
Finally, Howard-Jones et al. describe evidence for the importance of teaching children 
about the plasticity of the brain. More specifically, the authors claim that a student’s theory of 
learning can be influenced by their views of the brain, and further, brain theories of learning 
can be an important determinant of academic motivation and success.  The first claim is based 
on a study that found that children judged that the intelligence is more malleable in a multiple-
choice test after being taught that the brain is plastic (29% vs. 21% of children endorsed the 
statement “you can always change how intelligent you are” after the lesson; Dekker & Jolles, 
2015).  This is not a surprising finding (and furthermore, it is not clear what the right answer 
is).  The later two claims are based on studies that found teaching brain plasticity to students 
improved their academic motivation as measured by teachers (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & 
Dweck, 2007), and raised the grades of students most likely to drop out of school (Paunesku et 
al., 2015).  These later findings are striking, and replications would be warranted.  But in any 
case, these studies provide no evidence for EN.  In order to support the conclusion that learning 
about the brain is relevant to these findings it is necessary to show that the experimental group 
shows the same advantage compared to a control group who were taught about the psychology 
of learning and evidence that adults can learn (without reference to the brain).  This was not 
done. 
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It is perhaps worth noting that I am not claiming that it is logically impossible for EN to 
improve teaching in the future.  Rather, I am claiming that the principled problems with the 
logic motivating EN makes it unlikely.  It is always possible that a neuroscience finding will 
lead to a novel hypothesis regarding how cognitive processes support a skill (or how cognitive 
processes are impaired in the case of a deficit), and this hypothesis in turn suggests a new form 
of instruction, and this instruction is demonstrated to be useful in subsequent behavioral work 
(a case where the neuroscience precedes the behavior studies).  But there are no examples of 
this thus far, and it is hard to even imagine such an outcome.  Consider Gabrieli’s first example 
of neuroimaging constraining theory in a relevant manner for education; namely studies 
suggesting that dyslexia reflects a deficit in accessing phonetic representations rather than a 
deficit in the quality of the representations themselves (e.g., Boets et al., 2013).  For the sake of 
argument, put aside the fact that this hypothesis was first advanced on the basis of behavioral 
work (Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008).  The question still remains, what does an educator do with 
this hypothesis?  It is not at all obvious how an access deficit motivates a new form of 
instruction, let alone whether instruction should be designed to ameliorate or compensate for 
this deficit.  This is just one example, but the failure of EN to generate any novel hypotheses 
that suggest new forms of instruction is telling.  Far more promising is to develop and test 
hypotheses on the basis of behavioral work, and indeed, here, there are already many examples 
of psychological research doing just this (e.g., Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, & 
Willingham, 2013; Roediger, Finn, & Weinstein, 2012).  
Setting the record straight 
Let me briefly respond to the claim that I mischaracterized Goswami (2004a) in one of 
multiple “unfortunate use of quotes”.  The quote in question suggests that neuroscience can 
provide a more direct way of evaluating the efficacy of an intervention than behavior itself, but 
Howard-Jones et al. claim that the quote was taken out of context.  Although I maintain that my 
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reading of the full text is a reasonable interpretation of what was written, I am sorry for the 
confusion.  But in any case, the important point is not whether neuroscience provides a more 
direct measure of the efficacy of a treatment, but whether neuroimaging should be used at all in 
evaluating interventions. Goswami (2004a) does appear to endorse that view when she writes: 
“If the effects generalize to literacy (for example, via improved automaticity), then changes in 
occipital, temporal and parietal areas should also be observed” (no page yet).  And again this 
view seems to be endorsed by Goswami (2004b) in the quote provided by Howard-Jones et al.: 
“If an excercise-based package actually improves reading in dyslexic children, there should be 
measurable effects in the neural systems for reading” (p 179).  These statements are simply 
false.  For example, another possible outcome is that reading improves following exercise and 
it reflects compensatory processes that occur in brain regions not normally associated with 
reading, such as in the right prefrontal cortex.  Changes in the neural systems typically used for 
reading cannot be used to assess whether the treatment worked. 
Similarly, although Howard Jones et al. write that “EN does not claim… that 
educational achievement should be evaluated using brain imaging”, they appear to claim that 
that neuroscience is relevant to evaluating interventions in other contexts.  For example, as 
detailed above, the authors state that EN is useful when behavior measures fail to observe an 
effect following an intervention.  The implication is that brain imaging can be used to measure 
behavioral change that was not captured in task performance. More importantly, as noted in the 
target article, the claim that neuroscience is relevant to evaluating an intervention is common in 
the literature, but it is incorrect (see Coltheart & McArthur, 2012).  
Summary 
 In Bowers (2016) I claimed that EN has not contributed any novel insights into instruction 
above and beyond the behavioral research, and there are still no examples after this exchange.  
Similarly, as detailed here, there are no good examples of the neuroscience in EN uniquely 
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contributing to the early diagnosis of learning disorders or predicting longitudinal outcomes of 
a given intervention for specific children.  Perhaps most importantly, neither Gabrieli nor 
Howard-Jones et al. have provided any sound reasons to think that the neuroscience in EN will 
contribute to improving instruction in the future.  Given all the excitement and funding directed 
at EN, some educators and researchers might find these conclusions surprising.   
I want to emphasize again that I am not arguing that science is irrelevant to improving 
education, nor am I claiming that understanding cognition is irrelevant (as Howard-Jones et al. 
suggest).  Rather, I am claiming that psychology is the relevant discipline to improve 
educational outcomes for all children.  
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